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DEFINITION OF “INSOLVENT”
— by Neil E. Harl*
In handling discharge of indebtedness, the line between solvency and insolvency is
of critical importance.1  If a debtor is insolvent, the debtor does not have discharge of
indebtedness income2 although the debtor must “bleed” by reducing tax attributes and
reducing the income tax basis of assets.3  In the event the debtor is solvent, with two
exceptions, a debtor with discharge of indebtedness has ordinary income.4  Those
exceptions are for real property business debt5 and qualified farm indebtedness.6
A 1999 private letter ruling has signaled an important change in the position of the
Internal Revenue Service on how to calculate solvency.7
Calculating insolvency
The determination of solvency is made as of immediately before the discharge of
indebtedness.8  Insolvency is defined as an “excess of liabilities over the fair market
value of assets.”9  In making the calculation it appears that both tangible and
intangible assets are included in the calculations.  Both recourse and non-recourse
liabilities are included in the insolvency computation but apparently contingent
liabilities are not included.10  In a 1997 Tax Court case, a guarantee of partnership
debt was treated as contingent debt and was not included in the debt total for purposes
of the insolvency determination.11
The separate assets of a debtor's spouse are not included in determining the extent of
insolvency.12
Exempt property
The belief has been, for more than 50 years,13 that property exempt from creditors
under state law was not included in the insolvency calculation.  That conclusion,
based on a 1941 Board of Tax Appeals case,14 was reinforced by three more recent
Tax Court decisions15 and two private letter rulings issued in 1991.16  Howver, in a
1999 private letter ruling17 one of the 1991 letter rulings18 wa  revoked and the
Service indicated that it was changing its position on the issue.19  While it is unusual
for IRS to announce a major change in position in a private letter ruling, it is not
unprecedented.  In 1983, for example, IRS signaled a change in position on whether
special use valuation recapture was proportional in a letter ruling20 al hough that
involved effectively only overruling a series of private letter rulings.21  It is much
more unusual for a change in position to be announced in a private letter ruling where
the new position was counter to four Tax Court decisions and two of the Service's
own private letter rulings.
So how did IRS justify the change in position?  Basically, the Service said the
statute was clear—it places no limitation on the assets that are taken into account in
determining a taxpayer's “insolvency.”22  Thus, the plain meaning of the statute would
include all of the taxpayer's assets in the insolvency calculations.23  Moreover, the
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legislative history does not provide clear guidance regarding
the treatment of exempt assets for purposes of the insolvency
definition.24  The Service, in a surprising move, stated that if
the U.S. Supreme Court hasn't acknowledged or relied upon a
position, a judicial position need not be considered in
interpreting a statutory rule.25  The Service also pointed out
that when Congress intended to exclude state-exempt assets,
as in the Bankruptcy Code, it did so specifically.26
Finally, the Service pointed out that the revocation of the
1991 letter ruling27 applied to all open years under the statute
of limitations unless IRS uses its discretionary authority28 to
limit the retroactive effect of the revocation.29  The Service
did not use the occasion to limit the retroactive effect.
Additional move
In a Field Service Advice letter ruling,30 issued six days
after the key letter ruling signaling a change in position on
the insolvency calculation,31 IRS took the position that assets
owned in tenancy by the entirety by the taxpayer and spouse
(where the spouse was not an obligor on the obligation in
question) should be included in determining whether the
taxpayer falls within the insolvency exception to the
recognition of discharge of indebtedness income.32  The
reasoning in the FSA paralleled the reasoning in the letter
ruling indicating a change in the Service position33 and, in
addition, noted that the wide disparity among state exemption
statutes, particularly with respect to the residence, results in
non-uniformity of tax treatment among taxpayers.34
In conclusion
The key question is whether the new Service position will
stand up in court.  That seems doubtful in light of nearly 60
years of court decisions which have held to the contrary.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The Chapter 12 debtor was a farmer who
grew strawberries and other fruits on a 30 acre parcel which
included the debtor’s residence. The debtor claimed the parcel
as an exempt rural homestead. The debtor had filed a liability
lawsuit against a fungicide manufacturer, alleging that the
fungicide contaminated the land so as to prevent the raising of
fruit crops on the land.  The parties reached a settlement  and
the debtor had received or would receive a substantial payment
for damages to the debtor’s farm. The debtor used some of the
proceeds, and planned to ultimately use all of the proceeds, for
the rehabilitation of the farm. The debtor included the
settlement proceeds in the rural homestead exemption, arguing
that the settlement proceeds represented proceeds form the
involuntary conversion of the farm. The court held that the
settlement proceeds were included in the homestead exemption
because the proceeds resulted from the involuntary conversion
of the property and were to be used for the rehabilitation of the
property. In re Gilley, 236 B.R. 441 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999).
SECURED CLAIMS . The Chapter 12 debtor was a farmer
who grew strawberries and other fruits on a 30 acre parcel
which included the debtor’s residence. The farm was subject to
a mortgage held by the FSA. The debtor had filed a liability
lawsuit against a fungicide manufacturer, alleging that the
